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The Domain of Authority
DUDLEY KNOWLES
Folk are deeply ambivalent about authority. They react to claims of
authority with both suspicion and deference. The attitude of
suspicion has strong philosophical credentials, clearly expressed in
the following famous argument due to Robert Paul Wolff.1 First
there is an account of authority. A state that claims authority claims
a right to command understood as a right to obedience from the
subjects addressed by the command. These subjects have a
‘correlative obligation to obey the person who issues the command...
Obedience is not a matter of doing what someone tells you to do. It
is a matter of doing what someone tells you to do because he tells you
to do it.’2 Secondly, there is an account of autonomy. The
fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that persons have
free will, and, being rational, are responsible for their actions,
which is to say that they are autonomous. ‘The autonomous man,
insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He
may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to
do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free.’3 The
conclusion is swift and inevitable: there is an irresolvable conflict
between authority and autonomy. ‘Insofar as a man fulfils his
obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist
the state’s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will
deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because
they are the laws.’4
I put to one side discussion of this elegant argument, because I
want to draw attention to an important feature of it. Wolff’s
portrayal of the autonomous agent as freely examining the
commands of authority to determine whether or not he will comply
is deeply attractive. Wolff sternly tells us that the autonomous
exercise of the rational will is a duty, but I take his instruction as a
compliment, a recognition of my moral capacities. I can’t quite say
1 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper &
Row, 1976).
2 Wolff, op. cit., 9.
3 Wolff, op. cit., 14.
4 Wolff, op. cit., 18.
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that I hug myself at the prospect of moral athleticism but I find the
implication—that I should carefully inspect the credentials and
deliverances of any authority, challenging it when I smell a
rat—strongly appealing. There is a radical side to my nature which
this argument quickens. Much more importantly, I suspect that I
am not alone, that many other inheritors of the traditions of
liberalism feel likewise. Wolff’s powerful argument draws artfully
on more than Kant’s moral philosophy; it articulates, not to say
flatters, a central element of the self-image of modern citizens.
By contrast however there is evidence to suggest that this
self-image is flawed, that we are not the sturdy moral individuals
we portray ourselves as being. In a famous experiment Stanley
Milgram attempted to test subjects’ willingness to obey authority.5
The ‘authorities’ were university staff in appropriate uniform
(‘grey technician’s coats’) in their natural habitat (a laboratory
setting). Milgram briefly describes the experiment in these terms:
a person comes into a laboratory and, in the context of a learning
experiment is told to give increasingly severe electric shocks to
another person—who, unknown to the subject is a confederate,
and does not actually receive the shocks. This arrangement
provided an opportunity to see how far people would go before
they refused to follow the experimenter’s orders.
The appalling upshot was that the experimental subjects inflicted
step by step what they perceived as increasingly serious pain upon
the actors who kept making errors. Many did so reluctantly, some
did so to their own evident distress. But they continued to inflict
the pain because they were told to do so by persons they took to
stand in a position of authority and they were disposed to obey the
instructions.
Much has been said about the integrity of Milgram’s experi-
ment, but it has been repeated several times and does surely reveal
something that any observant and self-aware reader must suspect—
that we are much more ready to obey the commands of authority
than it is comfortable for us to concede. The most optimistic
conclusion is that we are nothing like so disrespectful of authority
as we would like ourselves to be, nothing like the potential
subversives with whom we smugly identify when we give Wolff’s
5 S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (London: Tavistock, 1974). The
material is summarized in Milgram’s article ‘Obedience’ in Richard L.
Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), cited below at 568–9.
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argument an initial sympathetic hearing. The most dire conclusion
is that, far from being suspicious of authority, we embrace it. We
flee from our pretensions of autonomy and radical freedom into the
arms of anyone who looks as though they might be in the position
of telling us what to do. Milgram concluded that ‘[T]his research
showed that many people do not have the resources to resist
authority, even when they are directed to act callously and
inhumanely against innocent victims’.6
The nature of practical authority
Philosophers have marked a distinction between practical authority
and epistemic authority, between the authority of the commander
and the authority of the expert,7 and I shall take this contentious
distinction for granted in what follows.
To fully understand the core elements of political authority we
should seek a fuller account of practical authority. H.L.A. Hart and
Joseph Raz have done most valuable work in this area. Following
Hart we should say that the authority of the commander is
captured by the quality of the reasons for action constituted by his
6 Some peoples may be more susceptible than others to the claims of
authority. Thus: ‘There is a story I like to tell. In Japan, if you tell the
[football] players to sprint at high speed into a brick wall, they will do it
unquestioningly. Then, when they crack their heads open and fall to the
ground, they look at you and feel completely betrayed. The English player
runs at full speed into the brick wall, gets up, dusts himself off and does it
again. He won’t feel betrayed by his manager or ask himself the point of
running into the wall.
Now, the French player, like the Italian, will react differently. He’ll look
at you and say, “Why don’t you show us first how it’s done?”... [The
English] do as they’re told, they follow orders, they do not question
authority and they never give up.’ (Arsène Wenger, as quoted by Gianluca
Vialli, excerpted from The Italian Job, The Times, 24 April 2006).
7 There is a vast literature on the kinds of authority. For examples, see
the symposium ‘Authority’ by R.S. Peters and Peter Winch, Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol.32, (1958), 207–40, and more recently,
Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Combat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 62–9. It is worth noting, too, that governments exercise their will
concerning the behaviour of subjects in many ways other than by simply
commanding them—they inform and advise them, they make requests,
they manipulate conditions to make options easier or more costly, and
much else.
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commands. Such commands are binding on those they address, are
peremptory and content-independent.8
To say that the commands or directives of practical authorities
are binding on subjects is to say more than that they simply apply
to them. It is to echo a Kantian thought, though in a more
restricted context and with a more limited force. Kant argues that
moral laws bind in a categorical fashion, contrasting categorical and
hypothetical imperatives. The latter, hypothetical imperatives
operate conditionally (and mostly contingently) on the desires or
inclinations of the subject. Thus ‘carry an umbrella’ is a reason for
action only if one wishes to stay dry or look smart. By contrast
categorical imperatives apply to the subject willy-nilly—universally
and unconditionally. In a similar fashion, the commands of a
practical authority are deemed to apply to subjects on the basis of
the normative relationship in which the subjects stand to the
authority irrespective of whatever desires and inclinations they may
have concerning the subject matter of the directives. Authoritative
commands cannot be cast off or repudiated as applicable reasons
for action simply on the basis of ‘I don’t want to do that’, as all
children learn to their cost or benefit sooner or later.9 To say that
the commands of legitimate authorities are binding is to grant that
they have some moral force, hence that, other things equal, one
does wrong who fails to comply. It is over-ambitious to insist that
such commands have absolute moral force in the manner of
8 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982),
243–68.
9 David Brink, distinguishes three strands in Kant’s claim that moral
demands are categorical imperatives: (1) an ‘inescapability thesis’ to the
effect that the application of moral requirements ‘to an agent does not
depend on the agent’s own contingent inclinations or interests’, (2) an
‘authority thesis’ such that moral demands ‘are requirements of reason
such that it is pro tanto irrational to fail to act in accordance with them,
and this authority is independent of the agent’s own aims or interests’,
and (3) a ‘supremacy thesis’ which insists that the authority of moral
requirements is always overriding.
To clarify: in taking authoritative norms as ‘binding’ I mean that they
are inescapable. I doubt, but it is moot, whether they ever have authority
in Brink’s sense, and I would deny that the norms of any practical
authority (e.g. the legal norms of the state) are overriding, i.e. have
supremacy. (David O. Brink, ‘Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability,
Authority and Supremacy’, in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.),
Ethics and Practical Reason, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 255. I’m
grateful to John Skorupski for urging me to clarify these matters.
Dudley Knowles
26
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 10 Sep 2009 IP address: 130.209.6.42
Kantian moral laws. Many political philosophers have discussed
the weaker claim that the laws of the state are binding prima facie,
i.e. defeasible in principle (though they may still have significant
moral force).10
A second feature of authoritative commands is that they have a
peremptory character. They are peremptory in that they cut off
‘deliberation, debate or argument’11. A different way of putting this
point is to say, with Joseph Raz, that such commands operate as
exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons.12 The essential feature of
peremptory commands is the way they feature in the logic of the
practical reasoning of the subject. Take the standard background
condition as one wherein the subject has reasons for and against
performing a given action, as might a soldier contemplating
whether or not to advance. A successful advance will eliminate a
threat to his own- and fellow soldiers’ lives. Yet it will expose him
to more danger than remaining in the trench. And so on ... If the
officer gives the order to advance, the order does not feature as
another reason to weigh in the balance, not even as a decisive reason
which will always tip the balance of reasons in favour of
compliance. If the order is the directive of an authority, this means
that the reasons hitherto assembled as pro and con just do not
count.
There will generally be a psychological correlate of this structure
of practical reasoning. Suppose a soldier were in fact deliberating
10 For a well-known discussion see M.B.E. Smith, ‘Is there a Prima
Facie Obligation to obey the Law?’, Yale Law Journal 82 (1973), 950–76,
reprinted in W.A. Edmundson (ed.), The Duty to Obey the Law (Lanham
MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 75–105. (Smith rejects the imputation
of even a prima facie obligation.) This terminology is rejected in A.J.
Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979), 24–28. For the detail of Ross’s original
distinction, which Simmons is correct to read as much confused, see Sir
David Ross, The Right and the Good, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1930). I shall not adjudicate the dispute here since I believe it is tangential
to the argument of this paper.
11 H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., 253.
12 Raz introduced the term ‘exclusionary reasons’ in J. Raz, Practical
Reason and Norms (London: Hutchinson, 1975), 35–8 and continues to use
the term in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 23–33.
In The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), the term
appears to have been dropped in favour of ‘pre-emptive reasons’. I shan’t
attempt to track down the similarities and differences between peremp-
tory, exclusionary and pre-emptive reasons.
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on what he should do, assembling and weighing reasons pro and
con. Just as soon as an order is given, the reasoning becomes otiose.
Deliberation, if there were any, is cut short, debate is misconceived,
and argument misses the point. The order, given that it is
authoritative, determines how the soldier ought to behave. Of
course, the fact that an order has been given can’t stop the soldier
continuing to deliberate the question of what is the best thing to do
if he is so minded. The point rather is that the order has the effect
of making the process of reasoning academic, in the unfortunate
sense of that term. It no longer counts as practical reason directed
towards action. How the soldier should act has been determined by
the order he has been given.
Political authority has the same feature. If directives such as laws
or the instructions of properly warranted officials (including army
officers as described above) are authoritative, then, of their nature
they determine what citizens ought to do, irrespective of whatever
reasons they may independently have for or against the course of
action they have been commanded to take. If this judgement is
thought implausibly severe, remember: nothing in the argument so
far has committed us to the conclusion that there are any such
authorities.
The final condition that Hart mentions is ‘content-
independence’. Authoritative commands ‘are intended [and should
be taken] to function as a reason [for action] independently of the
nature or character of the actions to be done’.13 Hart contrasts this
with standard cases where there is an obvious connection between
the reason for action and the action to be done, e.g. the action is a
means to some end specified as a reason for performing it. The
officer may shout ‘Advance’ or ‘Stay put’; in either case the
soldiers’ reason for advancing or staying put will be exactly the
same: that was what they were ordered to do. Their reason for
doing what they do when they obey orders does not bear directly on
the content of what they are to do, whatever that happens to be.
They must just do what they are told.
Peremptoriness and content-independence, thus construed, may
be judged to yield quite unacceptable consequences. If the point of
relationships of authority is to get subjects to do what they are told
willy-nilly, to adopt operative reasons for action peremptorily,
‘independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done’,
they should be treated with very great suspicion as Wolff saw. ‘I
was only following orders’ is a familiar excuse and is often treated
13 Hart, op. cit., 254.
Dudley Knowles
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with derision. Yet we are order-following, authority-submissive
creatures as Milgram demonstrated, so it behoves us to establish as
carefully as we can whether there might be anything other than a
dismal pathology underpinning authority relations as we have
characterized them. If one accepts that the commands of all
authorities are peremptory and content-independent, and under-
stands that to mean that the subjects of authority are required to
obey commands whatever their content, pre-empting any delibera-
tion they might conduct on the substance of the matter, it is quite
clear that no rational person will accept that there are practical
authorities in any sphere. If content-independence is construed as
integral to authority in this totally blank cheque fashion, it is
obvious that no rational subject can regard the commands of
authority as peremptory. Thus construed, authoritative directives
cry out for deliberative appraisal, and for that deliberation to count
as a process of genuine practical reason.
Robert Paul Wolff was challenging the claims of the state to
political authority, but we can see, if practical authority is
characterized quite generally in terms of the peremptory and
content-independent qualities of its binding directives, that the
critique of authority cuts much deeper than the challenge of the
philosophical anarchist to the state. It suggests that there is
something fundamentally irrational in any practice wherein
deferment to authority requires subjects to ignore the balance of
reasons as this features in processes of practical reason. Of course,
deferment to authority is perfectly reasonable in cases (as with
children) where ignorance or impaired rationality preclude the
subject’s own rational deliberation and determination. But in all
other cases authority seems to usurp the claims of fully rational
agency.
Faced with this challenge, the justification of authority is a stiff
task and there are plenty of philosophers who believe that it cannot
be accomplished successfully in the particular case of the authority
of the state. My intention in the rest of this paper is to prepare the
ground for a defence of practical authority, and in particular the
authority of the state, by demonstrating that the related properties
of peremptoriness and content-independence of authoritative
directives are not as threatening as they first appear.
The domain of authority
We should notice that the characterization of authoritative
directives as peremptory and content-independent becomes less
The Domain of Authority
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alarming if it is qualified, if we reflect that authority relationships
are always features of identifiable social practices and circum-
scribed within some specifiable domain. Let me explain the notion
of a domain. I take it that all authority relations are triadic, holding
between an authority, a subject or group of subjects, and a domain,
and articulated by a schema of the form:
a has authority over b with respect to [some domain] c.14
Thus for example (a) an army officer may order (b) the soldiers to
(c) advance or retreat—advancing and retreating being activities
which are within the domain of the instructing officer.15
I claim that the proper domain of any authority is limited.16 I
can’t claim this as a conceptual point since a religious enthusiast
may tell me that the authority of God is unlimited. He has the
authority to order me to do things which are [otherwise?] immoral
or just plain silly, to command me to slaughter my first-born son or
to forbid my eating cabbages. Such a claim to unrestricted authority
doesn’t strike me as conceptually flawed, though I believe it would
be very hard to defend. So let us say that all earthly authorities
operate within a circumscribed domain, a domain restricted by
conditions that establish boundaries intended to determine the
propriety of orders as intra- or ultra vires.
This idea should be very familiar to members of the armed
services and those who observe them. John Locke gives us a good
example:
[Y]et we see, that neither the Serjeant, that could command a
Souldier to march up to the mouth of a Cannon, or stand in a
14 A similar point is made by Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom,
62, Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988), 42, and Heidi Hurd, op. cit., 80–1.
15 I ignore a complication here. Strictly speaking the domain of a
particular authority encompasses both specified subjects and a limited
range of actions. The variables in the schema are not independent of each
other.
16 I think this general claim is just as true, and possibly more
obviously so, in the case of epistemic authority. As discussed below, I take
it that the omniscient and omni-competent God would be an obvious
counter-example for some believers in Him, but He is an example of
limited usefulness. Better use Google than God if you want instructions
on how to knot a bow-tie.
Dudley Knowles
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Breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that
soldier to give him one penny of his Money.17
The rules of war tell us that army officers who command their
soldiers to kill innocent civilians do so without authority and the
soldiers have no duty to comply. School teachers in a secular
educational system who instruct their pupils to say their prayers
before they go to sleep every night exceed their authority. Parents
find that as soon as their children come to understand that all
claims to authority come with boundary conditions attached battle
is engaged to establish and subvert those conditions.
The specification of intra-/ultra vires (boundary) conditions to
authority is a parochial exercise which varies from authority to
authority as states, religions, armed forces, schools and families
differ in the content and stringency of their particular rules. In
each case the specification of what matters are within and what
matters outwith the domain of a particular authority is of crucial
importance. Rules are sometimes clear, often not; sometimes
explicit, often not. I daresay, for example, that Locke’s case of the
ultra vires command to the soldier to hand over money to his
commanding officer is just about universal amongst armed services
yet is nowhere specified as one of the things that officers cannot do.
These things are just as surely true of claims to political authority.
If it is correct that all earthly authorities operate within the fixed
boundaries of some specifiable domain, it follows that the
peremptory and content-independent character of authoritative
commands has to be understood differently. Directives have a
peremptory character only when it is clear that they are intra vires.
If it is obvious that they are not, or if the issue of whether the
commander is acting within his proper authority is raised as moot,
then the directives cannot have peremptory force. Similarly, the
thesis of content-independence should be understood to operate
only within an accepted domain. If it is obvious that the content of
a directive does not respect the proper domain within which
authority should be exercised, or if the issue is thought to be
controversial, the matter of appropriate content should be
examined.
17 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, many editions: Second
Treatise, ch. XI, §139.
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Domain-limiting principles
Are there any principles which limit all claims to authority, which
circumscribe all putative domains? I can think of several principles
which might operate in this way.
(a) Immorality
The most obvious such principle is: commands which require subjects
to violate moral principles or otherwise to act immorally are void.18
There are two ways in which this domain restriction might operate.
Firstly and most obviously it would void commands which directly
instruct subjects to commit an immoral action. Secondly it would
void a command which is not otherwise immoral but which in the
circumstances can only be satisfactorily complied with by acting
immorally. Commands of either sort could have none of the
binding force that the directives of authority essentially carry.
There is a presumption that acting in accordance with authority
is the right thing to do, or at least is morally defensible. We should
remember that ‘I was following orders’ is a satisfactory defence in
standard cases. But since orders are void if they require subjects to
act in ways that are wrong for independent reasons, in these
circumstances ‘I was only following orders’ fails to exculpate the
obedient subject from the charge of wrong-doing, though it will
certainly implicate the authoritative superior who delivered the
orders in the crime that was committed. It cannot be right (in
virtue of an authority relation) to perform an action that is
otherwise wrong. This is exactly where the subjects in Milgram’s
experiment went astray. They forgot, or failed to understand, that
their compliance with the university authorities should cease just as
soon as it is clear that what they are doing is wrong. Likewise, it is
always wrong for the soldiers to shoot the innocent civilians,
notwithstanding the order of their superior officer. In this way
authority works like promise-giving and unlike consent. Promises
are void if they are promises to do wrong, or if doing wrong is the
only way to fulfil them, whereas consent can transform what is
18 Joseph Raz says: ‘Remember that sometimes immoral or unjust
laws may be authoritatively binding, at least on some people’, op. cit., 78.
Taking ‘immoral or unjust laws’ as laws that command citizens to do
immoral or unjust actions, my position implies that Raz is mistaken.
Dudley Knowles
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otherwise morally wrong (e.g. punching a fellow in the face) into
something which is morally permissible (boxing).
This is a clear enough view but it invites an objection. Grant that
it is wrong to break down a door and invade someone’s private
property. What are we to say of cases where a duly authorised
police officer forcibly enters someone’s house in order to release a
hostage? This certainly looks like a case of a person doing
something that is otherwise wrong which is vindicated by the fact
that the person was commanded (or authorised) to do so by a
legitimate authority acting within its proper domain. I suggest that
we view matters this way. Moral principles are rarely simple and
generally subject to qualifying clauses. So we should expect the
legal rules governing the ownership of private property to encode
complex moral judgments which assert the legitimacy of invading
private property in specifiable circumstances. Thus it is not the fact
that the police officer has been commanded to forcibly enter the
property which converts what is otherwise wrong into an action
that is permissible. The police officer is authorised to do so because
releasing the hostage is the right thing to do, all things considered.
By contrast, we do not accept that shooting the innocent civilians is
the right thing to do just because the soldier is commanded to do so
by a superior officer.
(b) Harm to Self
We should consider a second putatively universal boundary
condition, not least because it has a curious pedigree. Thomas
Hobbes argues that a subject is not obliged to comply with a
sovereign’s command ‘to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to
resist those that assault him’. This implies (although the attribution
of the implication to Hobbes would be mistaken): authorities may
not direct their subjects to put life and limb at risk.19 Citizens may
properly resist such a command or, in the case of conscription,
substitute another to take their place. G.W.F. Hegel rejects this.
19 Hobbes is best read as arguing that the sovereign does have the
authority to put citizens to death or at grave risk, but that citizens have no
duty to comply with such commands. Sovereign authority and citizens’
duties are thus detached. The sovereign does no wrong to issue such a
command and citizens do no wrong when they disobey. For Hobbes’s
complex discussion, and this quotation, see T. Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B.
Macpherson (ed.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), ch. 21, 26–9 [111].
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The substantial essence [of the modern state] does not consist
unconditionally in the protection and safeguarding of the lives
and property of individuals as such. The state is rather that
higher instance which may even itself lay claim to the lives and
property of individuals and require their sacrifice [in time of
war].20
But, Hegel insists, the state is the only authority that can require a
subject’s self-sacrifice.
We should recognize that the Hobbesian restriction is severely
limiting in the modern world, given our familiarity with the
practice of authorities’ requiring their subjects to accept the risk of
death and (often the certainty of) serious harm. No state would
restrain itself from claiming the power to conscript citizens into the
armed services in time of war, thus hazarding their lives. Military
authorities, whilst not actually commanding their troops to die, will
order them into some modern Forlorn Hope, the equivalent of ‘into
the breach’ or ‘over the top’, circumstances wherein the chances of
survival are slender. All states seriously harm those citizens whom
they punish severely, and citizens frequently regard, sometimes
rightly, the imposition of high taxation or the implementation of
planning decisions, to take a couple of familiar examples, as
seriously harmful to them. I suspect that if one were to propose
that the state or subordinate authorities must accept that a strong
possibility of death or serious harm operates as a universal
restriction on their authority, one would be left with political
authorities that are unrecognizable in the modern world. (Of course
this would not faze the anarchist or the sceptic concerning political
authority.)
Since I endorse (but do not here argue for) Hegel’s point that the
state is the only institution which can plausibly claim the authority
to oblige citizens to engage in activities which carry the risk of
death or serious harm, the question of whether there is a universal
domain restriction in play is a matter of substantial argument
concerning this particular case. It cannot be settled independently
of reviewing the arguments in favour of citizens’ acceptance of a
sovereign authority with this proper domain. If it turns out that
there are good reasons why the rational subject should endorse an
authority which possesses such fearsome powers—so be it. If it
transpires that the best way to preserve one’s life is to put that life
20 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W.
Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), § 100R. See also §§ 70 & 323–6.
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at risk in particular circumstances—to accept a liability to capital
punishment or conscription—one would reject such a restriction on
the domain of political authority.21
(c) Absurdity
There is a third possible universal boundary condition limiting all
authorities’ claims to obedience: commands that are palpably absurd
or pointless are void.22 The remit of any authority runs no further
than is recognized by common sense. This condition can be put to
good work in defence of the claim that authoritative commands are
peremptory and content-independent, since it is an obvious
objection to this thesis that whether or not a command is absurd or
pointless is surely relevant to whether a subject should comply. The
defender of authority can reply that if it is obvious or moot that a
command is absurd or pointless, then the content of the command
needs to be investigated since it is definitely or possibly ultra vires.
Sensible citizens, it is claimed, do not recognize a moral duty of any
substantial weight not to run a stop sign at two o’clock in the
morning, although the state requires them not to do so.23 And if the
absurdity or pointlessness of the content of the directive is relevant
to the issue of whether a subject should comply, this compromises
the claim that the commands of authority are peremptory and
content-independent, since the apparent absurdity or pointlessness
of a command calls for the subject to reflect on the matter of
whether the command should be complied with on the basis of its
content.
21 Rousseau believes this: ‘Every man has a right to risk his own life in
order to preserve it ... The death-penalty inflicted on criminals may be
looked on in the same light: it is in order that we may not fall victims to an
assassin that we consent to die if we ourselves turn assassins’ J.-J.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk II, Ch.V, cited from J.-J. Rousseau,
The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.D.H. Cole, rev. and aug. J.H.
Brumfitt and J.C. Hall, (London: J.M. Dent, 1973), 189–90.
22 Following an observation by Jo Wolff, I accept that the category of
the absurd is something of a ragbag, including as it does the absurd, the
pointless, the out of date and the blundering commands. I suspect that
what they have in common is that those who issue them, so long as they
are otherwise rational and not ethical monsters, would accept that it would
not be sensible to follow them in the circumstances.
23 This example is used by M.B.E. Smith, ‘Is there a Prima Facie
Obligation to obey the Law?’ in W.A. Edmundson (ed.), op. cit., 94.
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It’s possible that this challenge can be met in much the same way
that we met the challenge that folk should always investigate the
content of putatively authoritative directives whenever compliance
appears to require conduct that is palpably immoral. Just as we
argued that commands to perform immoral actions were ultra vires,
so we could claim that directives which require actions that are
absurd or pointless generally or in the circumstances are ultra vires,
too. This is a difficult route to take. Of course the commands of a
Mad King George or a Red Queen will be inspected with very great
care, but then none of their commands are likely to carry authority.
We need to distinguish a straightforward or generally absurd or
pointless directive from a directive that is absurd or pointless only
in the specific circumstances of a particular case.
Concerning absurd directives, I refer readers to Suetonius’s Lives
of the Caesars, particularly his accounts of the regimes of Caligula
and Nero, for non-controversial examples of genuine idiocy—
which is not to deny that many a prudent citizen readily complied
with the lunatic commands. The sort of cases that have figured in
the literature concern rules wherewith compliance is sensible for
the most part but not universally, for example, rules concerning
traffic and pedestrians designed to achieve road safety that have
little point between two- and six o’clock in the morning, as
mentioned above. But readers can work out for themselves why
crude and simple directives are often (but not always) better than
flexible instruments in this area of human activity. Really stupid or
pointless directives from otherwise respectable regimes tend to be
rules that are applied mistakenly or are, for example, out of date.
Imagine that the road works have been completed, yet the traffic
speed notices have not been altered. Drivers are still required to
drive at 30mph on the (now clear) motorway. I suspect that as soon
as drivers realise that there is an error in the signage, they will
ignore it and they are right to do so. In similar fashion, had it been
immediately obvious that ‘someone had blunder’d’, as Tennyson
put it, then the command to charge the enemy guns would not have
had peremptory force and the Charge of the Light Brigade should
have been called off.
We have not yet solved the problem however since we are left
with a couple of conflicting intuitions: first we have a general claim
that the directives of authority are peremptory and content-
independent only within the bounds of evident reasonableness and
that absurd or pointless commands are outside the domain of any
authority. But secondly it must surely be one of the main aims of
employing a regime of authoritative directives precisely to exclude
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deliberation (and consequent self-directed exemption) on those
grounds. A problem of similar structure may be raised concerning
the ‘immorality’ domain restriction. Can we resolve this tension?
There is a spectrum of cases between the absurd and the sensible.
In respect of the example above, we can expect that an authority
which is considerate of the lives and well-being of its citizens will
gold-plate rules of the road and many other regulations in
accordance with a precautionary principle which protects them
from unreliable fellows who have devised cunning excuses to
legitimate occasional deviance. Such a practice will produce at least
the appearance of unreasonableness on occasion to reasonable folk
who would be well advised to comply regardless. But in the second
place, and by contrast, one feels that if it is blindingly obvious that
the commander has blundered, then a review of the directive is
called for and its content must be carefully examined.
In the background here is a more general problem that we can
usefully bring into the open. What looks to be a problem for
authoritative directives has long been recognized to be a difficulty
with almost any set of rules.24 This shouldn’t be surprising since
many authoritative directives themselves constitute the imposition
of rules—the practice of legislation, notably. There is a very limited
set of rules which are absolutely mandatory in the sense that
compliance is so integral to the activity they regulate that they just
cannot be permissibly broken. You can’t move a pawn backwards at
chess and still be playing the same game. If such moves were
permissible, you would be playing a different game. For the rest, we
can easily recall or imagine circumstances wherein it is prudent or
right to break a rule. Sometimes difficulties of this sort will have
been anticipated and the rule itself qualified, but it is unrealistic to
attempt to protect the integrity of a rule by introducing
qualifications intended to anticipate every conceivable circumstance
in which a violation might be judged legitimate. And there is surely
a limit to the degree of complexity that can be introduced into the
statement of a rule if it is to operate peremptorily in the
psychological sense, finessing active deliberation—which is the
point of using rules-of-thumb. Rules cannot operate as effective
substitutes for onerous exercises of practical reason if successfully
following them requires much careful thought on the part of those
who are subject to them.
24 The nest of problems hereabouts is familiar from discussions of
utilitarianism.
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If this is true, it looks as though the subject of any regime of
rules must be reflectively schizophrenic—acting as the rules dictate
without further reflection yet being alert to circumstances in which
breaking the rules is the right thing to do. Does this fact suggest a
deep philosophical incoherence, contradiction or paradox in the
very concept of an authoritative command or rule, or does it
represent an uncomfortable feature of a world that is meant to try
us, a real practical difficulty, but one we can live with? I suggest
that the latter is the truth of the matter, because it is not always
difficult for an otherwise committed rule follower to identify an
occasion when breaking the rule is opportune and correct.
Sometimes it is obvious that the right thing to do is to break the
rule and that one can permissibly do this without the force of the
rule being significantly weakened.25
There must be countless examples. Here is one I recall because
incredibly and shockingly, as reported, rules of public decency as
voiced by a troupe of Afrikaaner matrons on a South African beach
triumphed over common sense and the poor casualty died: touching
a woman’s breasts without her consent is ruled an impermissible
assault, but if she is unconscious and requires urgent resuscitation
the lifeguard should just get on with the business of pressing down
hard on her chest. Doubtless there are also countless cases where
the matter is quite unclear. These are the cases that are meant to try
us. But the fact that there are clear cases suggests that committed
rule-following need not entail general moral obtuseness. One can
perfectly well go through life following the rules dictated by an
appropriate authority and yet be brought to a sharp stop when the
moral or prudential alarm bells ring. I take it that this is a fact of
our moral experience. This gives us no reason at all to believe that
the alarm bells are going to go off so frequently that the rule is
useless, or that occasional false alarms cause deep problems.
In the same manner that one can respect a rule yet violate it if the
circumstances dictate that it would be absurd (or immoral) to
follow it in the present case, so too one can respect an authority
even though it would be absurd (or immoral) in the circumstances
to comply with its instructions. In neither case does one deny or
subvert practical authority quite generally. Despite the difficulties
of the position, I am inclined to conclude that it is a universal
boundary condition on authoritative directives that they not be
25 Joseph Raz makes a similar point, distinguishing a great mistake
from a clear one. See The Morality of Freedom, 62. Raz’s argument is
challenged by Heidi Hurd, op. cit., 85–6.
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absurd or pointless, that it not be manifestly unreasonable to follow
them in the circumstances. I conclude, in respect of all authorities,
that they are circumscribed by general boundary conditions which
restrict their proper domains to exclude directives which prescribe
immoral or absurd actions.
Unlimited authority?
If all authorities are limited by the domain restrictions which
proscribe immoral and absurd or clearly unreasonable commands,
so too are political authorities. They will be constrained by the
universal restrictions we have discussed above as well as by specific
restrictions judged proper for the specifically political domain.
This claim appears to be more controversial than it ought to be,
which is to say that philosophers have found reason to dispute it.
There are at least two lines of objection.
In the first place, we note a common belief to the effect that
many political authorities claim unlimited authority. Joseph Raz
reports this, stating that ‘in most contemporary societies the law is
the only human institution claiming unlimited authority’.26 His
evidence is that English constitutional theory has it that Parliament
‘can make or unmake law, on any matter, and to any effect
whatsoever’. And even where, as in the United States, there is a
Constitution which limits the legislative power of the Congress and
the agency of the executive, the Constitution itself is open to
change. These matters of fact cannot be challenged, but they do not
yield the conclusion that Raz draws. They do not amount to a
judgement that law claims for itself unlimited authority, which Raz
glosses as ‘that there is an obligation to obey it whatever its content
may be’.27 Matters would be different if one were able to identify
the voice of the law making such a claim explicit, but the law itself
does not speak to matters of theory of this generality. We have to
look elsewhere.
We can examine what constitutional theorists say about the law
and what politicians or judges (or citizens) claim on behalf of the
law, attesting its self-understanding in their own persons. What
constitutional theorists say about the law, drawing out what they
26 J.Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 76. Raz does not endorse this claim
himself. Much of his book is concerned with delineating the proper limits
to authority. My criticism, if sound, has the effect of easing his path.
27 Raz, op. cit., 77.
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judge to be implications of the law of the constitution, presumes to
articulate the voice of the law or the constitution as though the law
or constitution as personified would recognize the imputation. Any
such readings are bound to be controversial, but we should notice
that it is just as likely that the voice of the law should be taken to
claim self-limiting as unlimited authority. The work of Ronald
Dworkin provides good evidence of this. His ‘rights thesis’
identifies as an ingredient of judicial judgement a requirement ‘that
judicial decisions enforce existing political rights’28. Dworkin may
be wrong about this in the case of the law and the Constitution of
the United States but his claim is worth serious attention. It is
certainly not falsified by the thought that the Constitution (and any
specific provisions of law) may in principle be revised.
It is true that many politicians have claimed inviolable authority
for the law, instructing potential rebels that law-breaking is always
wrong whenever there appears to be a prospect of widespread
disobedience to some particular item of legislation. Indeed I
remember hearing such voices at the time of the Poll Tax protests
in the United Kingdom in 1990. But as Raz fails to see, one can
insist that citizens must obey the law as it stands whilst denying
that Parliament can legislate any law to any effect, and one can deny
that citizens must obey the law whilst accepting that Parliament can
legislate as it pleases. The two issues—whether or not citizens are
obliged to obey the law and the legal limits of parliamentary
sovereignty—are entirely distinct.
The second objection is due to Thomas Hobbes who insists that
the authority of the sovereign must be absolute and unlimited—‘as
great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.’29 This is an
argument on how the law ought to be, not an argument concerning
how the law as it is should be interpreted. Hobbes’s reasoning is
simple: rational persons are taken to grant (authorise) the sovereign
just such powers as are necessary for the sovereign to accomplish
the citizens’ purposes of securing their lives and the conditions of
commodious living. If any limits were set to the sovereign’s power,
then there would need to be some higher authority with the remit
to judge whether or not the sovereign had exceeded the proper
limits, whether or not his actions were ultra vires. But if there were
such a higher authority, that authority would be the true (and
28 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977)
87.
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, 260 [107].
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absolute, unlimited) sovereign.30 If, by contrast, there were no
higher authority to adjudicate the conflicting claims, the dispute
would be irresolvable and the parties would stand to each other as
in a state of nature, a condition of incipient war. Ex hypothesi,
citizens should acknowledge that the alternative to an absolute
sovereign is not a limited sovereign, but no sovereign at all.
Hobbes’s argument is elegant but unsound. It may well have
been the case in Hobbes’s day, in the aftermath of Civil War, that
England needed a sovereign with pretensions to absolute, unlimited
power. Maybe the assertion of absolute, unlimited secular power
was necessary to contain the destructive ambitions of contending
clerics, as Hobbes believed. Then as now the curse of religious war
made a strong case for illiberal tyranny. Nonetheless it is just false
to claim that limited governments must be unstable and self-
destructive, liable to degenerate into an anarchic state of nature.
There is a very strong tradition of political philosophy which
emphasizes, against Hobbes, the limitations of legitimate authority.
John Locke in the Second Treatise of Government (published in
1690 and taking Hobbes as one of its philosophical targets) insists
that the authority of the sovereign is limited to the execution of
those purposes for which we must presume that authority was first
instituted—the public good, the preservation of the lives and
property of the citizens, the protection and prosecution of their
natural rights.31 Sovereign power which violates these limiting
conditions is illegitimate. If the commands of the sovereign
compromise the pursuit of these goods, or if they exceed this very
broad remit, they are ultra vires. And the people have no duty to
comply with the commands of a sovereign—a tyrant—whose
actions are ultra vires. By implication, and Locke makes the
inference crystal clear, the people have a right to rebel.
The form of this argument is particularly interesting since it
suggests that claims to political authority may be intrinsically
self-limiting. If such claims are advanced on the basis that political
authority is necessary for the achievement of specific goods, the
argument that succeeds in justifying political authority extends no
further than the secured domain. It is not as though we first have
an argument that grounds absolute authority, which authority then
finds its horns trimmed as further independent values are brought
30 ‘[T]hat King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not
supreme; that is to say not Soveraign.’ Hobbes, op. cit., ch 19, 246, [98–9].
31 J. Locke, op. cit., Second Treatise, chs. XI, XVIII–XIX.
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into play as side constraints or necessary qualifications. On the
contrary, we should recognize that arguments that purport to
establish the legitimacy of authority in the political (as in other)
spheres might bring with them their own domain restrictions.
Conclusion
I trust my arguments have demonstrated that the concept of
practical authority is not self-defeating in the manner that was
threatened as a consequence of our accepting the analysis of the
commands of an authority as binding, peremptory and content-
independent. These qualities of authoritative commands apply
only to directives that respect the proper domain established for the
issuing authority. I examined the possibility that there might be
domain-limiting constraints which operate universally to mark the
boundaries of practical authority and accepted that commands
which require immoral conduct, either directly or in order to secure
compliance, as well as commands which are absurd or unreasonable
in the circumstances, are to be judged as ultra vires.
If these efforts have been successful this opens up the possibility
of what would otherwise be a pointless enterprise—that of
discovering or establishing the specific domain limits of different
kinds of practical authority, and notably the domain limits of the
state, the political authority. This is a familiar enterprise and there
are many candidates for limiting principles: individual rights, the
harm principle, anti-paternalist principles and many others familiar
from the work of John Stuart Mill, and in modern times Joel
Feinberg and a host of others.32
Once this task is completed and we have before us a model of the
state with the authority to issue peremptory and content-
independent directives within a specified domain the central task of
political philosophy—the task of justifying the state—becomes less
32 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (1859, many editions), J. Feinberg, The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others, Offense to Others, Harm to
Self, Harmless Wrongdoing, 4 vols, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984–8).
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daunting (though no less onerous), and the appeal of the
philosophical anarchist is greatly diminished.33
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